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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1992) provides: 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involv-
ing a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons except in cases involving a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Appeals by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(h) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The accepted provisions of both parties' documents comprised the 
parties' contract, as agreed by them, and the defendant's pre-printed standard form did 
not supersede the plaintiffs contract, which was signed and agreed to by defendant at 
virtually the same time. 
Standard of Review: The interpretation and application of the two contracts is 
a question of law and this court will not defer to the trial court's legal conclusion, 
even though that conclusion denominated as a "factual" determination. Buehner Block 
Co. v. UWC Assoc.. 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988); 50 West Broadway Associate? vt 
Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1989); Scharffv. BMG Corp.. 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). The parties' intent and the determinative facts will not 
be disturbed if based upon substantial competent evidence. Kimball v. Campbell. 699 
P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) 
2. Whether the trial court erred in holding that Mr. Pack breached the 
contract when defendant: 
l 
t. Failed to complete the work of manufacturing and installing 
cabinets in plaintiffs home in a competent, workmanlike manner; and, 
b. Failed to provide specific drawings and plans as required under 
the contract. 
c. Failed to repair and correct the defective installation of cabinets in 
plaintiffs home; 
Standard of Review: The legal determination and result of the facts is a legal 
issue for which the court will not defer to the trial court's determination. Scharff. 700 
P.2d at 1070. The court will disturb tne trial court's findings of fact if the findings 
are determined to be clearly erroneous and are not based upon substantial competent 
evidence. In Rc Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Kimball, 699 P.2d 
at 716 
3. Whether the trial court erred in allowing defendant's employee to testify 
as a defense witness after she violated the witness exclusion rule. 
Standard of Review: Whether the witness' testimony in violation of the 
exclusion rule U admissible is a question of law and is reviewed under a "correctness 
standard". StlftY Fff™™* 817 P.2d 774, 781, n. 3 (Utah 1991) The court will 
not disturb any decision within the discretion of the trial court unless there is a clear 
showing of an abuse of that discretion. State v. Carlson. 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981) 
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4. Whether the trial court's award of attorney fees to defendant is supported 
by substantial, competent evidence and by adequate findings of fact. 
Standard of Review: An award of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of 
a clear abuse of discretion. However, an award of attorney fees must be supported by 
evidence in the record. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); 
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 219 (Utah App. 1990) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff/Appellant E.L. Pack & Associates appeals from the final judgment and 
findings of the Third Circuit Court after a trial on May 8, 1990, in an action for 
defendant's breach of contract to construct and install cabinets in plaintiffs new home. 
Course of thg Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Mr. Pack filed a complaint against the defendant on September 5, 1989, for 
defendant's breach of contract for failure to construct cabinets in accordance with the 
provision of contract documents, failure to correct defective workmanship and defects, 
failure to timely perform the construction work, and a failure to guarantee the material 
and labor all as required by the terms of the parties' contract. 
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Defendant Cabinet Shoppe file an answer and counterclaim, alleging that it had 
performed and satisfied the contract and that Mr. Pack had not paid a $5,000.00 
balance on the contract. 
After a one-day trial before the Honorable Maurice Jones in Summit County on 
May 8, 1990, Judge Jones took the matter under advisement. On July 6, 1990, Judge 
Jones orally ruled that the defendant's standard form contract completely superseded 
the contract prepared by Mr. Pack, and signed by defendant, and rendered its 
provisions void. The judge ruled that Mr. Pack had prevented the Cabinet Shoppe 
from completing the contract and awarded defendant $5,025.00 on the contract and 
attorney fees of $2,947.00. The court impliedly rejected Mr. Pack's substantial 
evidence of defendant's non-conforming, incompetent work, untimely performance and 
failure to correct defects. 
Defendant filed bankruptcy on July 6, 1990, in California. The resulting 
automatic stay delayed this matter almost two (2) years. After obtaining authorization 
from the bankruptcy court defendant filed Findings of Fact and a Judgment which 
were entered on June 29, 1992. 
Mr. Pack filed his Notice of Appeal on July 21, 1992. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Pack constructed his new home in The Jeremy Ranch subdivision in 1988. 
(Tr. 136) This home is a custom home, built with the highest quality materials and 
labor. (Tr. 13) 
Luanda Jean Lewis, a sales representative for the defendant Cabinet Shoppe, 
approached Mr. Pack at the construction site in April, 1988. She asked if she could 
bid on his cabinetry needs for the home. (Tr. 136) Mr. Pack accepted her request to 
bid, and gave Mrs. Lewis his house plan. The Cabinet Shoppe returned a bid of 
$17,700.00, with a drawing of proposed cabinets. (Tr. 136) 
Mr. Pack did not accept that bid. He informed the Cabinet Shoppe that he had 
a much different design and configuration in mind and requested a new bid 
corresponding to his concept and design. (Tr. 137) 
The Cabinet Shoppe placed a second bid corresponding to Mr. Pack's request. 
The bid totaled $13,000. (Tr. 137) The parties further negotiated the job 
requirements, the specifications, installation, and price until a final agreement was 
reached. (Tr. 139) 
On June 10, 1988, Mr. Pack wrote to Ms. Lewis at the Cabinet Shoppe, 
confirming various job specifications, including solid oak wood on all faces, frames, 
doors, drawers, fillers, trim and molding, and the outside of all the cabinets, 
completely precluding any plastic visible on the outside of any of the cabinets. (PI. 
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Exh. 6, Tr. 10, 18-9) Also, the Cabinet Shoppe was to provide specific drawings 
indicating the materials to be used in construction. (PI. Exh. 6, Tr. 10, 18, 19) Mr. 
Pack further insisted that the outside finish of the cabinets be "absolutely stunning". 
(PL Exh. 6, Tr. 18-9) 
Soon after his letter, Mr. Pack prepared a four-page agreement with the 
Cabinet Shoppe, including his job requirements which he signed and mailed to the 
Cabinet Shoppe on June 18, 1988. (PL Exh. 1) 
At about the same time, the Cabinet Shoppe mailed to Mr. Pack its "Standard 
Form of Agreement for Cabinets and Installation". Mrs. Lewis signed this agreement 
for the Cabinet Shoppe on June 22, 1988, and mailed it to Mr. Pack with two 
drawings prepared by her. (Tr. 144-5, PL Exh. 3) These drawings reflected a rough, 
basic layout of the sub-assemblies of the cabinets from a floor view only. (Tr. 17) 
Mrs. Lewis also enclosed two invoices, both dated August 6, 1988. Each invoice was 
designated "Cabinets, partial cost". One showed a price of $3,500, the other, a price 
of $5,000. (Def. Exh. 4, Tr. 145-6) 
Ms. Lewis also presented Mr. Pack with a handwritten "confirmation list". 
(PL Exh. 2) This document requested Mr. Pack to confirm the size and height of the 
ceiling, range hood, range top, oven and pan. (PL Exh. 2, Tr. 14) 
At the same time on June 22, 1988, that she signed her standard contract form, 
Mrs. Lewis also signed Mr. Pack's contract for the Cabinet Shoppe. She wrote 
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several comments on Pack's contract itself, such as "oak top veneer with oak nosing 
will have one seam" and "drawer front are screwed to pro-system". (PI. Exh. 1) 
When Mr. Pack received the Cabinet Shoppe standard contract form, he 
specifically rejected the "exclusive contract clause", para. no. 8, a limitation of work 
provision, para. no. 5, and the warranty provision at the bottom of the form. Mr. 
Pack wrote "takes exception" in the margin next to each of these the rejected 
provisions. (PI. Exh. 3, Tr. 15) Mr. Pack then signed the Cabinet Shoppe form on 
June 28, 1988 and returned it to the Cabinet Shoppe with a letter to Mrs. Lewis dated 
the same day. (PI. Exh. 7, Tr. 146-7) 
In Mr. Pack's June 28, 1988 letter (PI. Exh. 7) sent to defendant with 
defendant's contract, Mr. Pack again rejected of items 5 and 8 and the warranty 
language and explained that: 
As to paragraph 5 of the Cabinet Shoppe's agreement, we respectfully 
take exception to #5. Installation of cabinets is included in price. The 
Cabinet Shoppe also to install customer furnished Rangair hood and 
make transition from fan assembly to five inch flu. . . . We respectfully 
take exception to #8. Our agreement of June 18, 1988, is not 
superseded by Cabinet Shoppe's agreement. 
Mr. Pack reiterated his exception to the warranty language, specifying that the Cabinet 
Shoppe was to be liable for labor, mileage, travel, time and necessary materials to 
correct any warranty problems during the warranty period. (PI. Exh. 7) 
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Also in his June 28 letter (PI. Exh. 7), Mr. Pack specifies additional 
construction details of the cabinets, drawers and dimensions not included in the 
defendant's agreement. (PI. Exh. 7, Tr. 162) This letter and the signed standard 
form Cabinet Shoppe agreement were returned by Mr. Pack to Mrs. Lewis at the 
Cabinet Shoppe. (Tr. 144, 146-7) The Cabinet Shoppe accepted Mr. Pack's 
specifications, and did not respond to the June 28 letter. (Tr. 16, 147) 
Both parties testified and agreed at trial that both contract documents were 
intended to be their agreement, and that agreement was also supplemented by the 
drawings and other correspondence between the parties. (Tr. 16, 166) 
On July 14, 1988, Mr. Pack sent another letter to Mrs. Lewis at the Cabinet 
Shoppe, (PI. Exh. 8), asking her to furnish the detailed frontal view drawings required 
by the contract. The two pages of basic layout drawings were considered insufficient 
and inaccurate because they failed to show details,frontal views and elevations. (Tr. 
17, 20-1, 57; PL Exh. 8, 17) Further drawings anticipated by the contract were never 
provided. (Tr. 17) 
Throughout this time, Mr. Pack and various Cabinet Shoppe employees 
regularly communicated with each other through letters and phone calls. (Tr. 21-2) 
The expected delivery date for the cabinets was approximately July 18, 1988 
(PL Exh. 1), but the Cabinet Shoppe did not begin to deliver pieces and parts of the 
sub-assemblies until the third week of August, 1988. (Tr. 22) As of trial the 
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installation of the cabinets, also with a deadline of July 18, 1988, (PL Exh. 1) was 
never completed. (Tr. 22). The parties were in regular communication during this 
time regarding delivery and installation. (Tr. 22, PI. Exhs. 6-12) 
On October 4, 1988, Ms. Lewis mailed to Mr. Pack a Cabinet Shoppe invoice 
for $5,025 as the "balance on the cabinetry*. (Def. Exh. 5, Tr. 147) 
On October 19, 1988, Mr. Pack returned that invoice to Mrs. Lewis with his 
letter objecting because work on the cabinets remained incomplete. (PI. Exh. 9, Tr. 
23, 147) Mr. Pack included an extensive list of the uncompleted work, including: 
trim between cabinet above refrigerator and west wall; enlarge access to toe kick 
heaters; fill nail holes; finish out underside of cabinet above kitchen desk; dividers in 
cabinet above refrigerator need to be removable - also, the bottom slots and cheap 
plastic are visible; oak grid in kitchen light box has separated from main frame; 
delaminating roller trays; install tray on west lazy susan at correct height; missing 
shelves in kitchen and bath cabinets; close gap on upper stage cabinets above kitchen 
desk; appliance center has rough saw edge at counter top; laundry room drawer will 
not clear door casing; kick plate on laundry room cabinet does not go to floor; 
drawers in muter bath vanity do not operate smoothly; and, bottom drawer of kitchen 
desk was to be a file drawer. (PI. Exh. 9) Mr. Pack also complained of plastic 
facings on the cabinets and defendant's missed deadlines as to the delivery and 
installation. (PL Exh. 9, Tr. 26) Mr. Pack complimented Cabinet Shoppe worker 
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Mark Sellers on his "good job on the installation", but expressed frustration that Mr. 
Sellers' lack of communication regarding times he said he would be working on the 
job. Mr. Sellers would fail to keep scheduled appointments to work on the cabinets 
and gave no notice regarding his failures to show up. (PI. Exh. 9) 
Responding to Plaintiffs complaints, Mrs. Lewis attempted to excuse the 
Cabinet Shoppe's faulty performance and blamed Mr. Pack for excessive removing, 
rebuilding, and reinstallations. (Def. Exh. 6, Tr. 148) Mrs. Lewis failed to 
recognize that the removing, rebuilding, and reinstallations had been necessary 
because of the Cabinet Shoppe's failure to conform to the contract specifications. 
Mrs. Lewis agreed to repair a few of the enumerated deficiencies only if Mr. Pack 
would contact Mr. Sellers directly to finish the work, and provided that Mr. Pack 
delivered a cashier's check for $5,025 to Mr. Sellers at the time the repair work was 
done. (Def. Exh. 6) 
Mrs. Lewis threatened to file a mechanics lien on the home if Mr. Pack did not 
pay before November 8, 1988. (Tr. 149, Def. Exh. 7) 
Near the end of October, Mr. Pack and Mr. Sellers mutually agreed for 
completion of the work in the Pack home. (Tr. 176, 158, 26, 27) 
Mr. Pack prepared a letter dated November 1, 1988, to Mr. Sellers and 
enclosed his October 19, 1988, letter detailing the continuing defects with the 
cabinets. (PI. Exh. 10) The November 1 also letter set forth additional repairs 
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needed to provide access to the toe kick heaters, and requested removal of the red 
stain on the kitchen counter and replacement of the non-conforming CDX plywood 
trim on the entertainment center. (PI. Exh. 10) This letter was hand delivered to Mr. 
Sellers' office on November 2, 1988. 
On November 2, 1988, Mr. Gary Lewis and Mr. Sellers went to Mr. Pack's 
home. (Tr. 28-9) Mr. Lewis was also a principal in the Cabinet Shoppe. (Tr. 133-
4) He had never been to Mr. Pack's home before. Neither Lewis nor Sellers had 
arranged with Pack to meet them or informed him they were coming. (Tr. 66) 
When Lewis and Sellers arrived and found that Mr. Pack was not at the home, 
Mr. Lewis threatened physical violence to Mr. Pack's 72-year-old father (who was at 
the home), in an attempt to coerce payment. After Lewis' threats, the two Cabinet 
Shoppe principals then left the home without attempting any repairs or corrections. 
(Tr. 27, 176) 
When Mr. Pack returned home later and discovered what had occurred, Mr. 
Pack advised Mr. Lewis by letter that he, Lewis, was not permitted in Mr. Pack's 
home because of his threats on November 2, 1988. (PI. Exh. 11, Tr. 28) 
Also on November 7th, Mr. Pack spoke with Mr. Sellers on the telephone 
regarding the November 2, 1988, incident and Cabinet Shoppe's failure to make the 
repairs and corrections. (PL Exh. 12, Tr. 29) Mr. Pack again wrote to Mr. Sellers 
on November 11, 1988, to follow up the telephone conversation and detailed the 
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problems remaining on the job. (PI. Exh. 12) Mr. Pack's November 2 letter also 
detailed Cabinet Shoppe's failure to conform to original specifications, and detailed 
cabinet damage and other installation problems. (PI. Exhs. 12, 17) Finally, Mr. Pack 
advised Cabinet Shoppe that if it did not complete the cabinets by November 17, 
1988, Mr. Pack would complete the work himself and have the cost of completion 
deducted from the balance owed to the Cabinet Shoppe. (PI. Exh. 12) 
Despite these deadlines communications continued between the panties. On 
November 28, 1988, Mr. Pack and Mr. Sellers, discussed lowering the microwave 
and the oven cabinet installations. Mr. Sellers agreed to find an answer to those 
problems and respond to Mr. Pack, yet failed to do so. (PI. Exh. 13) 
On December 16, 1988, Mr. Pack detailed for Mr. Sellers, Pack's attempts to 
contact the Cabinet Shoppe over the past several weeks. Mr. Pack again gave 
defendant a partial list of corrections needed, referring to the cabinet above the 
refrigerator, roll-out trays, the entertainment center, and gaps between the cabinet 
doors. (Pi. Exh. 13) These items were never repaired or corrected. (Tr. 71) 
On that same day, the Cabinet Shoppe filed a notice of mechanics lien against 
Mr. Pack's home. 
At the time of trial the cabinets as installed still failed to meet contract 
specifications and/or were improperly installed as demonstrated by the photographic 
exhibits and Mr. Pack's unrefuted testimony: 
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Obvioui gaps exist between the kitchen cabinet doors. (PI. Exh. 26) 
The oven and microwave combination were mounted too high for 
convenient use. (PI. Exh. 27) 
The microwave trim kit cannot be installed as specified. (PI. Exhs. 27-
8) 
Splits exist in the framework of more than half of the cabinets in the 
home. (PI. Exhs. 29-30) 
The kitchen desk does not include a file drawer as specified in drawings. 
(PI. Exhs. 4, 31) 
The plastic tape used by defendant, contrary to contract specifications, is 
plainly visible and greatly contrasts the oak stain used on the cabinets. 
(PL Exhs. 32-4, 36, 38-42, 45-7, 52, 66) 
The shelf above the refrigerator visibly sags in the center and is missing 
trim. (PL Exh. 34) 
The range hood assembly fails to contain a raised panel in conformance 
with contract specifications. (PL Exh. 34) 
Obvious nail holes are filled with a considerably lighter shade of putty 
than the oak stain. (PL Exh. 35) 
The access to the toe kick heaters under the kitchen and master bath 
sinks is not large enough for removal and/or maintenance. (PL Exhs. 
37,67) 
The appliance center fails to open completely, includes obvious raw saw 
cuts, tad has not been properly squared off on the bottom left corner. 
(PL Exh. 38-9) 
The plastic tape bordering the appliance center was improperly laid 
which create obvious wrinkles in the tape and delamination. (PL Exh. 
40,42) 
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obvious gross misalignment of the majority of cabinet drawers and doors 
throughout the home. (PI. Exh. 45-6, 48, 66) 
Gouges, scratches, and chips in the oak and plastic tape. (Pi. Exh. 49, 
54, 61-2) 
Furniture buttons which plug access to screw holes are inconsistently 
featured and are inconsistent with industry standards. (PI. Exh. 51) 
Cabinet doors are visibly too short and much too narrow to cover plastic 
tape cabinet contents, and they are not in alignment with the end piece of 
the cabinet. (PI. Exh. 52) 
The linoleum and carpet had to be coved despite specific provisions in 
the parties' contract for oak kick plates. (PI. Exhs. 53, 59) 
The entertainment center features drawers in the lower stage cabinets 
despite specific communications to the contrary. (PI. Exhs. 8, 55, 58-9) 
The crown mold above the entertainment center has an obvious wide 
unjoined joint, visible throughout the room. (PI. Exh. 57) 
The CDX plywood on the east side of the wet bar assembly is stained 
and does not match the finished wood cabinet exterior. (PL Exh. 58) 
The upper stage cabinets in the entertainment center have not been 
completed with trim and molding. (PI. Exh. 60) 
The cabinet assembly above the student desk in bedroom number 2 is 
mounted several feet too high resulting in its being useless, and 
compromises half of the light fixture socket. (PI. Exh. 69) 
Mr. Pack alio described other defendants shown in the photographs admitted at trial 
and unrefuted by defendant. 
On September 5, 1989, Mr. Pack filed his complaint against the Cabinet 
Shoppe alleging defendant's failure to construct the cabinets in accordance with the 
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contract specifications, failure to correct defective workmanship and defects, failure to 
timely perform the construction work causing additional expense to him, and failure to 
guarantee defendant's material and labor as required by the contract. 
SUMMARY 0¥ ARGUMENT 
The parties9 contract included the terms prepared by Mr. Pack as well as the 
provisions which he agreed to in the defendant's standard form. The defendant's 
standard form did not wholly replace the plaintiffs prior document. Two separate 
documents (with the exception of certain provisions) constituted one contract for the 
construction and installation of cabinets in Mr. Pack's home. Both parties considered 
the two documents together to be the four corners of their agreement. However, the 
trial court ignored the parties' agreed testimony on this issue and threw Mr. Pack's 
contract out in favor of defendant's standard form contract. Mr. Pack had clearly 
rejected certain provisions of the standard form, writing "takes exception" next to 
those paragraphs in defendant's proposed agreement inconsistent with Mr. Pack's 
agreement aad agreed to specifications. Mr. Pack's rejections were never questioned 
by defendant. The court's finding that the second contract applies in its entirety is, in 
fact, a legal conclusion that is clearly in error and is not based on any evidence. 
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In addition, the trial court's finding that Mr. Pack failed to allow defendant to 
make repairs or corrections to the cabinets in the home is clearly erroneous and a 
complete marshaling of the evidence finds no support for this finding. 
The Cabinet Shoppe was awarded the full contract price by the trial court 
despite the overwhelming evidence that (1) defendant failed to provide the necessary 
drawings before installation and construction; (2) the job was only partially completed, 
and, (3) the completed work not comply with the contract terms, and was not 
completed in a workmanlike manner. 
The trial court also erred when it failed to exclude Mrs. Lewis as. a witness at 
trial and then allowed her to testify after hearing all of plaintiffs evidence. The 
violation of the exclusion rule enabled Mrs. Lewis to tailor her testimony to support 
defendant's other evidence and to contradict the testimony of Mr. Pack's witnesses. 
The trial court clearly abused its discretion by permitting defendant to violate the 
witness exclusion rule. 
Finally, the trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding attorney's fees to 
defendant. Although Utah law allows attorney's fees as per contractual agreement, 
the award must be supported by evidence in the record. In marshaling the evidence 
presented at trial, it is clear that defendant did not present evidence to support the 




THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE SECOND 
CONTRACT DOCUMENT SUPERSEDES THE FIRST 
CONTRACT DOCUMENT, AND THAT THE TERMS OF THE 
SECOND CONTRACT DOCUMENT CONTROL IS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
Two separate written contract documents were executed between the parties at 
about the same time. The first contract document was prepared and presented by Mr. 
Pack to defendant. The second contract document was defendant's pre-printed, 
standard form which defendant required Mr. Pack to sign. (Findings of Fact, para. 
1). The court correctly found that the parties considered both contract documents 
binding. (Findings of Fact, para. 2) (Tr. 16, 166) The court erred in ruling that the 
second document superseded the first. If parties intend to create one contract, the 
number of documents that comprise and memorialize the agreement is irrelevant. 
Sacramento Baseball v. Great N. Baseball. 748 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1987) 
Paragraph 8 of the parties second contract document reads "This agreement sets 
forth the entile transaction between the parties; any and all prior agreements, made by 
either party ire superseded by this agreement". Mr. Pack clearly rejected this 
provision by writing the phrase "takes exception" beside this paragraph, as well as 
paragraph 5 and the portion at the bottom of the contract document concerning 
warrant. In addition Mr. Pack sent the contract to defendant with a letter that 
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specifically stated shy he was rejecting those terms. Defendant accepted his changes 
and his letter and never responded to discuss those provisions further. (PI. Exh. 3, 
Tr. 15) 
However, despite defendant's acceptance of both contracts, the trial court found 
that the second contract document, superseded the first contract document. Despite 
Mr. Pack's written exceptions to paragraphs 5, 8 and the warranties of the second 
contract, the court concluded that any conflicting provisions between the contract 
documents would be controlled by the terms of the second contract document. 
(Findings of Fact, para. 3 and 4) Despite the defendant's acknowledgement that both 
contracts were binding and of Mr. Pack's unequivocal rejection of paragraph 8, the 
court mistakenly reached the legal conclusion (mistakenly stated as a finding of fact) 
that the language of the defendant's contract document completely eliminates all the 
terms agreed to by the parties contained in Mr. Pack's contract document. "A trial 
courts findings cannot be made up out of whole cloth; substantial, competent evidence 
must exist that supports the findings, and when a finding of fact is not so supported, it 
must be rejected." 50 West Broadway Associates. 784 P.2d at 1171 
The trial court erroneously completely discounted Mr. Pack's rejection of the 
paragraphs marked "takes exception". (Tr. 15) On cross examination when counsel 
for defendant asked what Mr. Pack meant by writing "takes exception" on those 
specific paragraphs of defendant's contract document, plaintiff stated: 
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A: We will not comply with it. It's a—it's a term that's commonly 
used in my industry when reviewing specifications that we will not 
provide per that item or comply with that item. 
Tr. 75. 
Furthermore, Mr. Pack's rejection of the "superseding" contract clause by the 
statement "takes exception" directly on the contract document itself clearly 
communicated that the defendant's contract did not supersede the first signed 
agreement. (PI. Exh. 7) Plaintiffs Exhibit 7 is the letter dated June 28, 1988, from 
Mr. Pack to defendant which accompanied the defendant's contract document signed 
by Mr. Pack. Mr. Pack testified that this letter explained the phrase "takes exception 
by stating: 
We respectfully take exception to No. 8. Our agreement of June 18th, 
1988, is not superseded by Cabinet Shoppe's agreement. 
(Tr. 15-6) 
Mr. Pack further stated that he never received any response to his letter regarding the 
inserted phrases, and that it was his understanding as well as the Cabinet Shoppe's that 
the complete agreement included both contract documents. (Tr. 15-6) Mr. Pack's 
contractual agreements and disagreement were written specifically on the document 
and were documented and explained in accompanying correspondence. The Cabinet 
Shoppe relied merely upon a pre-printed form. When a handwritten provision 
conflicts with typewritten or printed provision of a contract, the handwritten provision 
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controls. Wood River Pipeline v. Willbros Energy. 241 Kan. 580, 738 P.2d 866 
(1987); Emmert v. O'Brien. 72 Or. App. 752, 697 P.2d 222 (1985) Yet the trial 
court ignored Mr. Pack's rejection of defendant's pre-printed, boiler-plate clauses. 
During her testimony, Luanda Jean Lewis, defendant's employee, admitted that 
she received Mr. Pack's letter with the agreement. (Tr. 162) She also testified that 
the Cabinet Shoppe considered both documents binding as part of the parties' 
agreement. (Tr. 166) 
The law protects the reasonable expectations of both party to the contract. 
Nixon and Nixon. Inc. v. John New & Associates, 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982); 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991) In order to interpret such 
reasonableness of the expectations
 ? it is necessary to examine and understand the 
communications between the parties discussing these provisions. (See PI. Exh. 7) 
All writings forming part of the same transaction are interpreted together. 
Restatement of Contracts, § 235 (1932) If both parties' contracts were intended by 
both parties to comprise the terms of a single agreement between them (Tr- 16, 166) 
then the agreement should be enforce according to those terms. And, those terms 
included thote not objected to. Pack's handwritten notation "takes exception" can 
only mean to any reasonable layman that paragraph 8 of the second document was not 
intended to be and was not an agreed term of the contract and that "unaccepted" to 
terms in both documents were agreed to. 
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The Restatement of Contracts. § 236 further requires the trial court to accept 
both contract documents prepared by the parties, and signed off by both parties as the 
complete integrated agreement, including the written phrase inserted by Mr. Pack. 
(c) Where there is an inconsistency between general and specific 
provisions, the specific provisions ordinarily qualify the meaning of the 
general provisions. 
* * * 
(e) Where written provisions are inconsistent with printed provisions, an 
interpretation is preferred which gives effect to the written provisions. 
Restatement of Contracts § 236 (1932) 
The trial court's ruling is also in conflict with the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts. When Mr. Pack returned defendant's contract document he clearly advised 
defendant that the "exclusivity provisions" and the warranty language were not 
accepted and were not part of the agreement. (PI. Exh. 7) The defendant never 
objected to or disputed Mr. Pack's rejection of those terms. Both parties understood 
that the agreement included both contract documents and the accepted provisions 
therein. (Tr. 15-6) 
Defendant's failure to respond to Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 clearly affirmed to Mr. 
Pack that paragraphs 5 and 8 and the warranty language of defendant's boiler-plate 
contract were not part of the agreement. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 201 
provides that: 
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* * * 
(2) Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or 
agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the 
meaning attached by one of them if at the time it was made 
* * * 
(b) that party had no reason to know of any different 
meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason to 
know the meaning attached by the first party. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. § 201 (1979) 
Moreover, the general prevailing meaning of the language "takes exception" is 
a rejection of that provision to which the language is addressed. See, Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts. § 202(3) (where language has a generally prevailing meaning, 
it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning). 
Mr. Pack defined his own "takes exception" notation to mean that, " . . . 
we will not comply with it". (Tr. 75) Several legal definitions and the general 
meaning of "except" or "exception" support Mr. Pack's interpretation of "takes 
exception". Black's Law Dictionary, quoting In re; Kelly's Estate, 153 Misc. 445, 
274 N.Y.S. 488 (1934) defines "exception" as: 
. . . a person, thing, or case specified as distinct or not included; an act 
of excepting, omitting from mention or leaving out of consideration; and 
"except" means not including. 
Black's Law Dictionary. 667 (4th Ed. 1951). "Exception" has also been defined as "a 
restriction by taking out something which would otherwise be included, as in a class, 
statement, or rule." Markle v. Markle. 20 Hawaii 633 (1911), and as to specific 
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terms used with reference to contracts "is the taking some part of the subject-matter of 
the contract out of it." Wilmington & R.R, Co, y, Robeson, 5 Ired. 391, 27 N.c. 
391, 393 (1845) cL Jones v, Acme Building Products. Inc., 22 Utah 2d 202, 206, 
450 P.2d 743 (1969), (trial court properly admitted extrinsic evidence to show the true 
intentions of the parties, because "fair and equitable result will be preferred over a 
harsh or unreasonable one"). In addition, the court held: 
Generally speaking, neither of the parties, nor the court has any right to 
ignore or modify conditions which are clearly expressed merely because 
it may subject one of the parties to hardship, but they must be enforced 
"in accordance with the intention as . . . manifested by the language 
used by the parties to the contract." 
Id. While the trial court in the case at hand properly admitted extrinsic evidence to 
show the true intent of the parties, the court's legal conclusion directly contradicts the 
clear and undisputed evidence of that intent. 
Where documents are executed "substantially contemporaneously and are 
clearly interrelated, they must be construed as a whole and harmonized, if possible." 
Sparrow v. Tayco Construction Co., Utah Ct. App., No. 910370-CA, Slip Op. (Feb. 
4, 1993); AUli Corp, V. ClQVJS Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987) 
The court's legal conclusion that only the defendant's pre-printed standard form 
contract document constituted the entire agreement is inequitable and clearly contrary 
to both parties9 evidence. 
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POINT n 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
BREACHED THE CONTRACT AND IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
DEFENDANT BREACHED THE CONTRACT. 
It is the responsibility of the trial court to make findings on all material issues. 
If the trial court fails to make findings to each issue, then those findings are reversible 
error unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted and capable of 
supporting only a finding of fact in favor of the judgment. Acton v. Deliran. 737 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987); Potter v. Potter. 205 U.A.R. 37 (Ct. App. 1992) 
The trial court found that plaintiff "materially breached the contract by failing 
to pay for the cabinets" (Finding of Fact 7). However, despite plaintiffs 
overwhelming and unrefuted evidence presented of uncompleted, substandard 
cabinetry work, unsightly workmanship and the failure to provide specific drawings as 
required in the parties9 contract, the trial court made no findings of fact thereon. 
In addition the court's finding that Mr. Pack refused to allow repairs to be 
conducted to the cabinets is totally against the weight of the evidence. The court's 
findings as to plaintiffs breach will be reversed only if the findings are determined to 
be erroneous or otherwise mistaken. In Re Estate of BartelL 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 
1989). 
The court's findings and judgment of a "breach- by Mr. Pack and the refusal to 
find defendant's breach are not supported by substantial, competent evidence. 
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A, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO 
ALLOW DEFENDANT TO MAKE REPAIRS OR CORRECTIONS 
IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by defendant and 
signed by the trial court, Findings of Fact, paragraph 7 reads in part: 
7. The court finds that Pack materially breached the second 
contract . . . by failing to allow the Cabinet Shoppe to make the 
corrections requested, and that the Cabinet Shoppe had no reasonable 
opportunity under the circumstances to make the corrections requested. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 4. However, the evidence presented at 
trial clearly demonstrates this finding is clearly erroneous and against the weight of 
the testimony. 
The cabinets were to be delivered and installed on approximately July 18, 1988. 
(PI. Exh. 1) Defendant's contract document states "delivery date, when given, shall 
be deemed approximate . . . . " (PL Exh. 3, para. 2) However, defendant did not 
begin to deliver cabinets to Mr. Pack's home until some time in mid-August (Tr. 169) 
and did not install the cabinets until a much later date. Between the date of delivery 
in August and November 7, defendant worked on the installation of the cabinets many 
times with no claim by defendant of any kind of interference from Mr. Pack. 
Defendant first complains it was interfered with on November 2, 1988. (Tr. 176) 
There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Pack ever prevented defendant from 
correcting or finishing its work. 
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On October 19, 1988, Mr. Pack sent a letter to defendant detailing several 
problems to be corrected and completed. (PI. Exh. 9) The letter detailed many areas 
in Mr. Pack's home that remained uncompleted, including adding trim between the 
cabinet above the refrigerator and west wall, filling nail holes in crown mold and 
dental mold, finishing out the underside of the cabinet above the kitchen desk (PI. 
Exh. 48), enlarging the access to the toe kick heaters in the kitchen and master bath 
(PI. Exh. 67), making the dividers in the cabinet above the refrigerator removable, 
repairing the oak grid in the kitchen light box which became separated from the main 
frame, repairing two or more rolling trays because of bad appearance and 
delamination (PI. Exh. 50), installing shelves in the upper stage of the west corner 
cabinet in the kitchen, installing shelves in the upstairs hall bath vanity, smoothing the 
rough saw edge of the countertop on the appliance center (PI. Exh. 39), and placing a 
file drawer in the kitchen desk as per drawings (PI. Exh. 31). 
Defendant responded to Mr. Pack's letter of October 19, 1988 (PI. Exh. 9) 
with a letter of October 22, 1988 (Def. Exh. 6). In that letter, Mrs. Lewis, while 
defending the work of the Cabinet Shoppe, acknowledged that defendant would repair 
several items in Mr. Pack's home to his satisfaction including the trim over the desk 
and shelves, adjustment of the drawers and placement of the file drawer. Ms. Lewis 
agreed that she knew that the job was not completed to Mr. Pack's satisfaction. (Tr. 
169-70; Def. Exh. 6) Mrs. Lewis also acknowledged the need to arrange a 
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reasonable, convenient time to repair the defects. The letter also discussed making 
arrangements to meet at the Pack home and finalize the details. (Tr. 64) 
After Sellers agreed to meet with Pack and resolve unfinished problems, Sellers 
and Mr. Gary Lewis showed up at Mr. Pack's home on the evening of November 2, 
1988. When Mr. Sellers and Mr. Lewis discovered Mr. Pack was not at home 
waiting with a certified check, Mr. Lewis threatened Mr. Pack's 72-year-old father 
with violence. 
Mr. Pack, after the threat of violence to his father, felt it necessary to advise 
Mr. Lewis (only Mr. Lewis) that he would not be permitted on the job at plaintiffs 
house. Mr. Lewis had never been on the job site prior to November 2, 1988. (Tr. 
28-9; PI. Exh. 12) 
Mr. Lewis never testified and never denied his threats. Mr. Sellers, who did 
testify, admitted that Lewis and he got into a "heated discussion" as to why Mr. Pack 
was not there to supervise or approve the work. Mr. Pack testified that he did not 
agree that he would be there when Sellers came or that he would provide a cashier's 
check on demand. (Tr. 64-6) 
After the November 2, 1988, incident, Mr. Pack on November 7th 
communicated on the telephone with Mr. Sellers as to the items which remained to be 
completed, and problem areas which needed to be corrected and Mr. Sellers' next 
appearance on the job to address those items. (Tr. 29) The conversation between 
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Mr. Pack and Mr. Sellers was documented in Plaintiffs Exhibit 12, a November 11, 
1988, letter sent to Mr. Sellers as well as plaintiffs daytimer. (PI. Exh. 17) This 
letter again set forth items which needed to be completed or repaired. Mr. Pack 
referred to the telephone conversation between himself and Mr. Sellers in which Mr. 
Sellers agreed to be at the Pack home on November 17, 1988, to complete the work 
specified in the contracts and letters of October 19, 1988, and November 1, 1988. 
(PI. Exhs. 12, 17) Mr. Sellers did return to the job a couple of times (Tr. 176), but 
by December 1 of 1988 defendant totally stopped coming to Mr. Pack's house for any 
reason leaving even the Cabinet Shoppe's punch list uncompleted. (Tr. 70-1) Clearly 
defendant had access to the job site, until defendant decided not to finish its job. 
Cases from Washington and Oregon discuss the issue of repairs and the 
opportunity of contractors to conduct repairs. In Henery v. Robinson. 67 Wash. App. 
277, 834 P.2d 1091 (1992) the court rejected defendant's argument that plaintiff had 
refused to allow repairs to be done to plaintiffs mobile home. The evidence 
demonstrated that plaintiff permitted multiple repairs before filing suit and defendant 
had been gives a "reasonable opportunity to cure the defects". Id. at 1096. 
In Imyn^n v Prcssnall. 274 Or. 285, 545 P.2d 1382 (1975), the buyers, like 
Mr. Pack, gave the seller a list of defects in the home and gave the seller ample 
opportunity to cure defects. The court allowed the buyer to revoke their acceptance of 
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the home, despite buyers' claims that sellers refused to allow further attempts to 
repair. 
Mr. Pack clearly afforded defendant numerous opportunities to return and 
complete the job contracted for, indeed, from mid-July when the job should have been 
completed until the end of November. (PI. Exh. 17) Defendant had ample notice of 
the problems in Mr. Pack's home which needed to be repaired or completed. (PI. 
Exhs. 9-10, 12) Defendant breached the contract by failing complete the job it 
contracted to perform. 
The only evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion is the refusal by Mr. 
Pack to allow Mr. Lewis to return to the house after threats were made to plaintiffs 
father. This evidence when compared to testimony and court exhibits produced at 
trial, clearly falls short of being persuasive. Mr. Lewis never did any work at the 
Pack home before November 2, 1988, and none of the other Cabinet Shoppe 
employees were ever banned from Mr. Pack's home. In fact, Mr. Sellers returned 
several times to continue work on the Pack home, (Tr. 176) but failed to complete the 
job. 
The parties contracted for cabinets of the "highest quality" (PI. Exh. 1) and 
agreed that the cabinets would be in "conformity with customary industry practices." 
(PI. Exh. 3) Defendant failed to complete the job, thereby forfeiting any claim to the 
full contract price. The trial court cannot employ Mr. Pack's sole exclusion of Mr. 
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Lewis as evidence for their legal conclusion on this issue. Mr. Pack's actions in 
refiising to allow Mr. Lewis into the Pack home were warranted by the "threats of 
violence" to Mr. Pack's elderly father. The trial court's decision which allows 
defendant to forego the completion of the job, yet allows collection of the full contract 
price plus legal fees and costs is clearly erroneous. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DEFENDANT THE 
FULL AMOUNT OF MONEY OWED UNDER THE CONTRACT, 
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO COMPLETE TILE 
WORK CONTRACTED FOR AND/OR FAILED TO COMPLETE 
THE WORK IN A WORKMANLIKE MANNER. 
Mr. Pack hired defendant to construct "high-class", quality cabinets for his new 
home. (Tr. 14) The contract documents signed by the parties reflected plaintiffs 
insistence on high quality workmanship. (PI. Exh. 1, 3) 
In the contract document prepared by Mr. Pack and signed by both parties, 
very specific instructions were given requiring the "highest standard of quality" and 
the "latest state of the art manufacturing techniques with a high regard for quality 
control," (PL Exh. 1, p. 4) 
The pfe-printed contract document prepared by defendant requires the same 
high quality which assures performance in "conformity with customary industry 
"practices" and warranties against "defects in material and workmanship". (PI. Exh. 
3) 
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Even aside from the express provisions in the contract documents regarding 
workmanship, a contract for product and/or services imposes a duty to perform in a 
skillful, diligent, and workmanlike manner. Where parties contract as they did here, a 
warranty is implied that the contract will be performed in a good workmanlike 
manner. Good v. Christensen. 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974); New Trends. Inc. v. 
Stafford-LowdonCo.. 537 S.W.2d 778, 782 (Tex. Cir. App. 2 Dist. 1976); Chutich 
v. Samuelson. 333 Colo. App. 195, 518 P.2d 1363, 1366 (1974); Lewis v, Anchorage 
Asphalt Paving Co.. 535 P.2d 1188, 1196 (Alaska 1975); sL, Mascaras v, 
Jaramillo. I l l N.M. 410, 806 P.2d 59, 61 (1991) 
Defendant represented to plaintiff that it could and would perform a first class, 
top of the line job. (Tr. 14) Mr. Pack relied upon defendant's representations in 
entering into the contract. 
Construction contracts cannot be completed in a substandard way. In Good. 
527 P.2d at 224 the purchasers of a home sued a construction company after a heavy 
snowfall caused the carport to collapse. Although the court denied recovery by 
plaintiffs because the statute of limitations had run, the court stated: 
A failure to perform work on any construction in a good and 
workmanlike manner affords the owner a cause of action immediately. 
Id. at 224. 
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Plaintiffs expert witness at trial, Russell Ross, is a professional cabinet maker 
and has been for over twenty (20) years. (Tr. 78) Mr. Ross testified at length to the 
condition and appearance of defendant's work. It was his expert opinion that poor 
workmanship on the cabinetry was visible throughout the entire home. (Tr. 115) In 
fact, Mr. Ross confirmed and verified the deficiencies shown in plaintiff's numerous 
photographs, which are trial exhibits 26 through 69 and are detailed on pages 9, 13, 
14, 26 and 27. (Tr. 86-114) Mr. Ross' testimony was not controverted or refuted by 
any other evidence. (Tr. 78-120) Mr. Ross further detailed the estimate of cost of 
$4,361.50 necessary to comply with the original contract requirements. (Tr. 91; PI. 
Exhs. 24-5) 
In addition, defendant's own witness, James Sheldon Wayne, an employee of 
Machinery & Hardware Supply, (Tr. 121) testified that although the parties contracted 
for the "highest quality hinges available" (PI. Exh. 1) the Ferrari hinge was used in 
Mr. Pack's home. This hinge is of a lesser quality than the Nepla hinge, carried by 
Mr. Wayne's store. (Tr. 127) Mr. Wayne also confirmed other problems in the 
defendant's workmanship, including a noticeable color contrast between the PVC tape 
and oak fronti, and stain, (Tr. 129, PL Exhs. 27, 32-34, 36, 38-42, 45-6, 52, 63, 66) 
and torn, gouged oak veneer and scratched PVC tape. (Tr. 131, PI. Exhs. 40, 42, 
49, 54, 61, 62) All of the problems testified to by Mr. Ross and Mr. Wayne 
contribute to the overall substandard appearance of the cabinets. 
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Evidence at trial was presented through testimony and Plaintiffs Exhibits 9, 10 
and 12 of specific work contracted for but not delivered. The uncompleted work did 
not encompass extra items or add-ons but were within the four corners of the original 
agreement. (Tr. 26) 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 9, a letter to Mrs. Lewis from Mr. Pack dated October 19, 
1988, detailed at least 18 repairs and corrections that needed to be completed by 
defendant. These items, fully detailed in the fact section, included work on the toe 
kick heaters (PL Exhs. 37, 67), enlargement of access ports for repair and 
maintenance, replacement of the CDX plywood on the side of the wet bar assembly 
(PL Exh. 58), repair to trim and nail hole molding as well as closing gaps on kitchen 
cabinets. (PL Exhs. 26, 45-7) Plaintiffs Exhibits 10 and 12, letters from Mr. Pack 
to Mr. Sellers on November 1, 1988, and November 11, 1988, respectively, reiterate 
many of the above repairs needed to be made by defendant. The defects and 
incompletions were never remedied. (Tr. 27) 
As the only member of the Cabinet Shoppe who worked on the cabinet 
installations in Mr. Pack's home, Mr. Sellers should have been well versed in the 
specifications of the contract between the parties. Mr. Pack included very specific 
instructions in his four-page contract document and assumed that these contract 
provisions would be strictly adhered to. Mr. Sellers testified that he "probably never 
read" the contract document prepared by Mr. Pack. (Tr. 187) Mr. Sellers had no 
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knowledge that the contract document stated the Cabinet Shoppe was to mount the fan 
and transition from the fan outlet to the exhaust flue, even though he installed it. (Tr. 
187) Mr. Sellers did not know the contract document said the overlay fillers were to 
be double thick or the same thickness as the cabinet doors on all the cabinets, so he 
did it a different way, not in accord with the contract documents. (Tr. 187-8) Had 
Mr. Sellers read the contract documents or communicated with the cabinet 
manufacturers, many of the above-mentioned repairs and corrections would surely 
have not been necessary. 
The evidence clearly shows that defendant is not entided to the full contract 
price of $8,500.00 under the contract documents. The contract was never completed 
despite defendant's knowledge of its deficiencies and numerous opportunities afforded 
to correct them. Moreover, defendant's completed work was not up to industry 
standards, despite the promise in defendant's contract document, "Seller agrees that it 
will perform this contract in conformity with customary industry practices." (PI. Exh. 
3, para. 10) The only Cabinet Shoppe installer never even read the contract 
documents or any of the written correspondence regarding the job specification, and 
therefore wit ignorant as to what was required therein. 
Finally, when a person contracts to perform work the law implies a contract on 
his part to do the job in a workmanlike manner and to exercise reasonable care in 
doing the work. Scott v. Strickland, 10 Kan. App. 2d 14, 691 P.2d 45 (1984) The 
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evidence presented to the trial court is legally insufficient to support the outcome of 
this action. Defendant failed to perform according to the contract and failed to 
perform in a workmanlike manner and subsequently is not entitled to judgment against 
plaintiff. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE 
DEFENDANT BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY NOT 
PROVIDING SPECIFIC DRAWINGS AND PLANS AS REQUIRED 
BY THE PARTIES' CONTRACT. 
Defendant admitted at trial that it intended to be bound by both contract 
documents: the pre-printed standard form order supplied by the Cabinet Shoppe, as 
well as the contract document prepared by Mr. Pack. (Tr. 12, 14-5, 166, PI. Exh. 1, 
3) The contract document prepared by Mr. Pack states: 
Contractor to provide owner with three complete sets of drawings on all 
cabinets and return with signed agreement. Drawings to include details 
of all features. Drawings to be approved by owner. 
Mr. Pack testified to the importance of this provision several times during the course 
of his testimony. (Tr. 17, 56-7) Most problems with the cabinet assembly and 
installation would have been avoided had the drawings ever been provided. 
Plaintiff tad defendant's witnesses testified to the fact that plaintiffs Exhibits 4 
and 5 were drawings showing the basic layout of the sub-assemblies of the cabinets. 
However, these drawings failed to show any frontal views (Tr. 17), details (Tr. 17, 
57), or any elevations of the cabinets (Tr. 57). Mr. Pack testified that even though he 
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took delivery of the cabinets, he continued to insist on detailed drawings in letters and 
telephone conversations with defendant. (Tr. 57) On re-direct testimony of Mr. 
Pack, it was revealed that modifications to the cabinet assemblies were required, not 
because Mr. Pack changed his mind, but because without detailed drawings Mr. Pack 
had no way of knowing how the completed cabinets would appear. (Tr. 76) 
Defendant's witness, Luanda Jean Lewis, also testified concerning the 
drawings. She stated that she prepared the preliminary drawings (Tr. 144) and sent 
them to Mr. Pack with the Cabinet Shoppe's contract document. Mrs. Lewis, when 
questioned on direct examination about the drawings stated that she felt the first set of 
drawings would give Mr. Pack a general idea of the layout and she did not feel it was 
necessary to redraw all the fascia drawings. (Tr. 15) Mrs. Lewis continued her 
testimony, saying she usually "didn't do that type of drawing [fascia drawings] at all." 
(Tr. 154) 
Mrs. Lewis confirmed on cross examination that the drawings defendant 
provided did not identify cabinetry elevations and were different from the as-built 
product. (Tr. 164) 
Defendant failed to present any evidence whatsoever that the drawings provided 
to Mr. Pack were reliable (they were not), or that detailed drawings requested by Mr. 
Pack were not necessary. In fact, plaintiffs expert, Russell Ross, testified that it was 
a customary industry practice for a cabinet maker to provide detailed drawings to the 
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owner of a particular project. (Tr. 81) Mr. Ross stated that a customer should have 
elevations of the cabinets provided to him because without such face drawings and 
elevations, the owner would be unable to deduce what finished cabinet assembly 
would look like until they were in the home. (Tr. 82) 
Defendant failed to perform according to the precise language of the contract 
documents it signed. They failed, despite repeated requests by Mr. Pack through 
letters and telephone conversations, to provide any detailed drawings. The drawings 
provided to Mr. Pack failed to give frontal views, details, materials, or any elevations 
despite testimony that customary industry standard is to provide detailed drawings. 
Without detailed drawings, the homeowner cannot know the appearance of the finished 
product. 
While a court's factual determinations will not be disturbed if based on 
substantial evidence, Kimball. 699 P.2d at 716, no finding was made by the trial court 
as to this issue. However, the evidence presented does clearly show that defendant 
failed to perform their obligations under the contract. There is no evidence to marshal 
in support for the trial court's decision on this issue, as none was offered. 
The evidence, supported by testimony and exhibits at trial, is unclouded. Mr. 
Pack clearly allowed Mr. Sellers to continue to work in the home, the cabinets were 
not completed to specifications, nor done in a workmanlike manner, and drawings 
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which would have greatly facilitated and simplified the construction of the cabinets, 
were never supplied. Substantial, competent evidence must exist to support a trial 
court's findings. 50 West Broadway Associates. 784 P 2d at 1171 The trial court's 
Finding of Fact No. 7 that Mr. P^ck materially breached the contract, is not so 
supported. 
Furthermore, the legal determination and result of the facts presented is a legal 
issue for which the court will give no deference to the trial court's determination. 
Scharff, 700 P.2d at 1070. 
POINT m 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S 
WITNESS TO TESTIFY AFTER VIOLATING THE WITNESS 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE INVOKED BY DEFENDANT. 
Defendant moved to exclude the witnesses at trial before opening statements 
and the court granted defendant's motion. Mr. Russell Ross, the plaintiffs expert was 
thereby excluded from the courtroom. Defendant's counsel at this point claimed that 
his witnesses were an exception to the ruling and entitled to remain because they were 
principals of the defendant company. Defendant also had a third witness "who's not 
here yet, and I've got no problem with him being excluded/ (Tr. 5) Even though 
only the principals should have been allowed to remain on behalf of defendant 
company, non-principal Luanda Jean Lewis was present throughout the trial. After 
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opening statements Mr. Pack, plaintiffs expert and defendant's first witness testified 
and were cross-examined by the respective attorneys. 
When Mrs. Lewis took the stand to testify she revealed that she was not in fact 
a principal or owner of the Cabinet Shoppe, but was only married to a co-owner, 
Gary Lewis. Plaintiff's counsel immediately objected to Mrs. Lewis' further 
testimony because defendant violated the court's order excluding witnesses. 
The trial court determined that defendant's counsel had falsely represented that 
Mrs. Lewis was a principal in the business. (Tr. 134) However, the trial court 
erroneously excused the prejudicial nature of the violation and Mrs. Lewis' obviously 
tainted testimony. Mrs. Lewis was allowed to testify even though she had been 
present and heard the testimony of each of the other witnesses. (Tr. 134) 
Whether the witness' testimony in violation of the exclusion rule is admissible 
is a question of law and is reviewed under a correctness standard. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 
at 781, n. 3 
Upon violation of the exclusion rule, several enforcement options are available 
to the court, including punishment for contempt, exclusion of the testimony of the 
violating witness, and/or a declaration of a mistrial or setting aside of the verdict. 
Annotation, Counsel's Reference, In the Presence of Sequestered Witness in State 
Criminal Trial, to Testimony of Another Witness as Grounds for Mistrial or Reversal, 
24 A.L.R. 4th 489 (1983). 
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The violation of the exclusionary rule by Mrs. Lewis severely prejudiced Mr. 
Pack. Mrs. Lewis was present during and heard all the relevant testimony. She heard 
plaintiffs expert and defendant's first witness testify. More importandy, she heard 
Mr. Pack testify. She was the person who conducted all contract negotiations with 
Mr. Pack, received all of Mr. Pack's correspondence. She had ample time to 
formulate expiating responses to Mr. Pack's testimony regarding her contacts with him 
and their discussions regarding defects and installation. 
Mrs. Lewis' presence during the prior testimony was a direct violation of the 
principal purpose behind the exclusion of witnesses rule; i.e. to prevent witnesses 
from hearing other testimony and questions. The rule exercises restraint on a witness' 
opportunity to tailor and conform her testimony to that of earlier witnesses. The rule 
aids the court and counsel to detect testimony that is less than candid. Geders v. 
United States. 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330 (1975). Having heard all of Mr. Pack's 
testimony, Mrs. Lewis was able to tailor her answers to do as much harm to his 
testimony as possible. All preliminary discussions, contract negotiations and 
discussions erf uncompleted or incorrect work were exclusively between Mr. Pack and 
Mrs. Lewis. (Tr. 14-21, 136-40, 145-8, 153-8, 187) 
When the rule excluding witnesses is violated, a just, appropriate remedy 
depends upon the prejudice shown. Here the prejudice is obvious by examining Mrs. 
Lewis' testimony and the trial court's ruling. Even so, "trial courts have full power 
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to punish violations of such orders as contempt even when the violation is not 
prejudicial." State v. Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254, 1264 (Utah 1983). In the case at 
hand, the trial court abused its discretion when it did nothing despite Mrs. Lewis' 
obviously unfair opportunity to hear plaintiffs testimony and to prepare her own 
counter-testimony. 
Mrs. Lewis was able to counter the major defects Mr. Pack described to the 
court. Her answers seem tailored to direcdy confront and challenge Mr. Pack's 
testimony, including how defendant graciously reduced the contract amount to satisfy 
Mr. Pack (Tr. 138-9), and how Mrs. Lewis' carefully recorded specific dimensions 
with respect to the cabinets (Tr. 142-3). She claimed that defendant "felt that 
everything had been accomplished that he [Pack] had requested at that time" before 
sending defendant's bill in October. (Tr. 147) Mrs. Lewis' contended that she never 
saw plaintiffs correspondence until the day before the trial (Tr. 149). She was able 
to manufacture alleged instructions from Mr. Pack but on cross examination could not 
recall when or where such instructions were given. (Tr. 151-2) 
Defendant's direct examination of Mrs. Lewis was facilitated by the fact that 
she was present during the previous testimony. For example, defendant's attorney 
premised his examination of Mrs. Lewis on the prior testimony of Mr. Pack: "Mr. 
Pack testified that he went to a Citation homes-home to inspect?" Mrs. Lewis 
responded "Yes". (Tr. 160) 
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Plaintiffs expert, Mr. Ross, when asked questions about a "trim kit" for an 
appliance testified that under normal circumstances it would be possible to ascertain 
what size to build a cabinet to fit the trim kit. (Tr. 98-9) Mrs. Lewis admitted in her 
cross-examination that she received a letter with appliance dimensions enclosed, but 
never dimensions for the trim kit. (Tr. 143) During cross-examination Mrs. Lewis 
adamantly denied the ability to adapt the cabinet for the trim kit without the specific 
specifications. (Tr. 161-3) Her adamant denial logically stemmed from the strong, 
expert opinion of Mr. Ross, whose testimony she should never have heard. 
Mr. Pack, was prejudiced by defendant's witness* "informed testimony", and is 
entitled to relief. The trial court abused its discretion by allowing defendant's witness, 
who remained in the courtroom, influenced and coached by what she heard, to testify. 
At the least, plaintiff should be entitled to a new trial on this ground, if not outright 
reversal. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
AWARDING DEFENDANT ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES AT TRIAL. 
The trkl court correctly exercised its ability to award attorney fees in this 
action. It is a well-settled rule that attorney fees may be awarded if they are provided 
for under an enforceable contract provision and the award is consistent with the terms 
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of the contract. Hoth. 799 P.2d at 219 Utah law also provides that calculation of 
reasonable attorney fees will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear 
abuse of discretion. Dixie State Bank. 764 P.2d at 988; Turtle Mgmt.. Inc. v. Haggis 
Mgmt. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982) 
However, an award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence in the 
record. Dixie State Bank. 764 P.2d at 988; Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622, 624 
(Utah 1985) ("award of attorney fees must generally be made on the basis of findings 
of fact support by the evidence and appropriate conclusions of law"). 
As clearly shown in prior arguments, the evidence presented at trial does not 
support findings of fact and conclusions of law adopted by the trial court. In fact, the 
"findings" of fact are not true factual findings from the evidence at trial, but are legal 
conclusions against the clear weight of all the evidence, trial. While the court found 
that both contract documents were signed by the parties, and the parties felt both 
contract documents were binding, (Findings of Fact 1 and 2), the trial court 
inexplicably concluded that the contract document prepared by the Cabinet Shoppe 
controlled because paragraph 8 in that document excluded all prior agreements 
(notwithstanding its clear rejection by Mr. Pack). 
The trial court's "finding" really concluded that even though Mr. Pack clearly 
wrote "take exception" beside paragraph 8, this language only "expresses displeasure 
with these terms, and does not eliminate those provisions from the second contract." 
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(Finding of Fact 4) Mr. Pack explained the phrase to the Cabinet Shoppe in a letter 
sent to defendant on June 28, 1988, and upon hearing no reply understood both 
contract documents to be controlling (Tr 16) and the rejected provisions to be out of 
the contract, as did defendant (Tr. 166). 
The trial court further concluded that Mr. Pack awarded defendant no 
opportunity to satisfy objections made regarding the Cabinet Shoppe's performance 
and in doing so, Mr. Pack breached the parties' contract. (Findings of Fact 6 and 7) 
The arguments set forth in Point II clearly show that all evidence presented at trial is 
contrary to the trial court's "finding" on this issue. 
The trial court's "finding" no. 9, awarding defendant the fall amount owed 
under the contract is also in error. The argument above clearly outlines the fact that 
defendant never completed the job or complied with the term prerequisite for 
payment. Defendant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under the contract. 
The trial court's legal conclusion is obviously not supported by the factual 
evidence presented at trial. In fact, the award of attorney fees to defendant 




Many problems arose in the construction and installation of these cabinets, 
which never should have arisen. Had the Cabinet Shoppe performed according to the 
terms and specifications of the contract, Mr. Pack would have no complaints and the 
contract would have been paid in full. However, defendant failed to fulfill the 
contract and manufacture a quality, acceptable product. Clearly defendant is 
responsible for the problems and Mr. Pack was justified in refusing to pay. Now 
defendant, a bankrupt corporation, has been awarded a judgment as if it fully 
performed, which it did not. Plaintiff has a terrible cabinet job that will cost more to 
bring up to the minimum contract standards than the unpaid amount on defendant's 
contract. Defendant even now claims interest for the two years it delayed the 
judgment in this matter by its bankruptcy. 
This contract consisted of the accepted terms in both agreements and the letters 
detailing cabinet specifications. Defendant failed to meet the terms of that contract 
and is not entitled to payment, (PI. Exh. 1) 
Defendant's judgment should be reversed and the case remanded, for entry of 
judgment in favor of Mr. Pack, for his damages as supported by the record, his 
attorney fees and release of the mechanics lien. Defendant's judgment should be 
entirely vacated. 
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Respectfully submitted this of February, 1993. 
HENRIOD, HENRIOD & NIELSEN 
£^(SA/Okld^ £a. 
Stephen L. Henriod 
Clark R. Nielsen 
Sara Bendel Ryan 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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S. Main, 12th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on the £ Z l d a y of February, 
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Stephen L. Henriod 
Clark R. Nielsen 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
A. Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale dated June 29, 1992 
B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated June 29, 1992 
C. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, Mr. Pack's Contract, signed by defendant on June 22, 1988 
D. Plaintiffs Exhibit 3, The Cabinet Shoppe Standard Form Contract, signed by 
defendant on June 22, 1988 
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L. Edward Robbins, #2766 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Counterclaimant 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Streetn 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-7030 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
E. L. PACK & ASSOCIATES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE CABINET SHOPPE, INC., 
Defendant/Counterclaimant 
THE CABINET SHOPPE, INC., 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAFFALL TILE & MARBLE, a Utah 
corporation; CAFFALL TILE & 
SUPPLY, INC. dba CAFFALL TILE 
QUALITY LINE PRODUCTS, E. L. 
PACK, JR., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE 
AND ORDER OF SALE 
Civil No. 89-CV-45 
Honorable Maurice N. Jones 
The court having entered its Findings of Fact and 




IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That there is due and owing to the defendant/ 
counterclaimant The Cabinet Shoppe Inc. (hereinafter "Cabinet 
Shoppe") from the plaintiff/counterdefendant E. L. Pack & 
Associates and third party defendant E. L. Pack, Jr. (hereinafter 
"Pack") the sum of $5,025.00, together with interest from and 
after October 4, 1988 until paid at the rate of ten percent (10%) 
per annum until entry of decree and twelve percent (12%) per 
annum thereafter, together with attorney's fees and costs of 
court of $2,947.00. Pursuant to Rule 4-505(3), Rules of Judicial 
Administration, this amount shall be augmented in the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said 
judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by 
affidavit. 
2. That said sums are secured by a mechanic's lien recorded 
December 16, 1988 as Entry #301604, Summit County recorder, and 
constitute a lien on the following described real property: 
Lot 41, Jeremy Ranch Plat #1, according to the 
official records of the County Recorder of Summit 
County, State of Utah 
3. That the secured premises shall be sold at public 
auction in the manner prescribed by statute by the Sheriff of 
Summit County, State of Utah. 
4. That said Sheriff, after the time allowed by law for 
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redemption has expired, shall execute a deed to the purchaser or 
purchasers at the sale, and if any of the parties to this action 
who may be in possession of the premises, or any part thereof, or 
any person who has come into posession since the commencement of 
this action shall refuse to deliver possession of the premises, 
or any part thereof, to such purchaser or purchasers on 
production of the deed for the premises, or any part thereof, the 
said purchaser shall be entitled to the issuance of a writ of 
restitution, without further notice, to compel delivery of the 
premises to the purchaser or purchasers. 
5. That the proceeds of the sale shall be applied as 
follows, in the following order: 
First, to the payment of the Sheriff's fees, costs of sale 
and disbursements; 
Second, to the payment to the plaintiff of the total sums 
set forth in paragraph one above; 
6. That should the proceeds of sale be insufficient to pay 
the sums above-described, then plaintiff may be entitled to a 
deficiency judgment against Pack upon filing the proper 
affidavits to support such a judgment. 
7. That Pack, and all persons claiming under them, after 
the filing of the lis pendens, be and they are hereby forever 
barred and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and equity of 
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redemption in and to the secured premises and every part thereof, 
from and after the date of the delivery of the deed of the Sheriff 
of Summit County, State of Utah. 
DATED this C^f day of jL^y^^< ,„^  , 1992. 
BY THE 
Approved as to form: 
Stephen L. Henroid 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on the day of June, 1992, I 
served the foregoing Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale upon 
the following by hand delivery of a true and correct copy to his 
offices at the following address: 
Stephen L. Henroid 
Henroid & Henroid 
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&0 Eaat Oouth Main atreete (?S S.fTrtTC TPUEET^ V*rrxS**^&*^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant 
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No, 
L. Edward Robbins, #2766 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Counterclaimant 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Streetn 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-7030 
F I L E D 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
E. L. PACK & ASSOCIATES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE CABINET SHOPPE, INC., 
Defendant/Counterclaimant 
THE CABINET SHOPPE, INC., 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAFFALL TILE & MARBLE, a Utah 
corporation; CAFFALL TILE & 
SUPPLY, INC. dba CAFFALL TILE 
QUALITY LINE PRODUCTS, E. L. 
PACK, JR., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 89-CV-45 
Honorable Maurice N. Jones 
This matter came on for trial on the 8th day of May, 
1990 before this Court sitting without a jury, the Honorable 
Maurice N. Jones presiding. Following trial, the Court announced 
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Addendum B 
its findings and conlusions in open court and now enters its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Counsel for 
defendant/counterclaimant has represented to the court that 
following trial Gary and Lowanda Lewis, prinicpals in the Cabinet 
Shoppe, filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy proceeding in California, 
hence the delay in preparing formal Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. For simplicity, plaintiff/counterdefendant 
E. L. Pack and Associates and Third Party Defendant E. L. Pack, 
Jr. shall be referred to as "Pack" and defendant/counterclaimant 
The Cabinet Shoppe, Inc. shall be referred to as "Cabinet 
Shoppe." 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court finds that there are two contracts in this 
case, one prepared and presented to the Cabinet Shoppe by Pack 
(Trial Exhibit 1), and one prepared and presented to Pack by the 
Cabinet Shoppe (Trial Exhibit 3). Both contracts were signed by 
the parties. The first contract consists of four typewritten 
pages, the first page of which bears the caption "E. L. Pack & 
Associates." The second contract consists of one typewritten 
page and bears the caption "Standard Form Agreement for Cabinets 
and Installation." Both contracts were signed by the parties. 
2. The court further finds that the parties felt both 
contracts were binding, however, there are conflicts between the 
contracts which the court must decide. 
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3. The court finds that the second contract, by its terms, 
supercedes the first contract and that as to any conflicting 
provisions, the terms of the second contract control• The court 
bases this finding on paragraph eight of the second contract, 
wherein it is said that "This agreement sets forth the entire 
transaction between the parties; any and all prior agreements, 
made by either party are superseded by this agreement." 
4. The court further finds that although Pack wrote "takes 
exception" to paragraph eight of the second contract, as well as 
to other provisions of the second contract, that his so writing 
was not a sufficient act to eliminate those provisions from the 
agreement betweeen the parties. The court finds that to 
eliminate those provisions from the second contract, Pack should 
have lined out those provisions. The court finds that while the 
language "takes exception" expresses displeasure with those 
terms, it does not eliminate those provisions from the second 
contract. 
5. The court further finds that although the Cabinet Shoppe 
initially bid the job in question at $17,000.00, it finally 
agreed to perform the job for $8,500.00, of which amount Pack 
paid $3,500.00. 
6. There is also an issue as to contract performance. The 
court finds that even under the superceded terms of the first 
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contract, the Cabinet Shoppe offered to make the corrections 
requested by Pack upon payment by Pack for the work, but that 
Pack did not cooperate so as to permit this to happen. The 
second contract specifically requires payment to be made upon 
delivery of the cabinets. Pack took no exception to this term 
and yet when the Cabinet Shoppe attempted to satisfy his 
objections so as to receive payment, Pack afforded the Cabinet 
Shoppe no opportunity to make repairs or adjustments. 
7. The court finds that Pack materially breached the second 
contract by failing to pay for the cabinets and by failing to 
allow the Cabinet Shoppe to make the corrections requested, 
and that the Cabinet Shoppe had no reasonable opportunity under 
the circumstances to make the corrections requested. 
8. Consistent with the foregoing findings, the court finds 
against Pack as to the allegations of his complaint, no cause of 
action being proven thereon, and all damages claimed thereby 
being speculative. 
9. The court finds that Pack paid $3,500.00 of the 
$8,500.00 contract price, leaving a debt owed to the Cabinet 
Shoppe of $5,025.00 ($5,000.00 plus $25.00 late charge), 
together with interest at the legal rate from and after October 
4, 1988, the date of demand by Cabinet Shoppe, until paid. 
10. The court further finds that the Cabinet Shoppe is 
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entitled to recover its attorney's fees and costs of court under 
paragraph seven of the second agreement. In this case, counsel 
for the parties have submitted affidavits as to attorney's fees 
and costs of court incurred. The court finds the attorney's 
fees and costs set forth by counsel for the Cabinet Shoppe to be 
in sufficient detail and reasonable under the circumstances, and 
hereby awards attorney's fees and costs of $2,947.00 to the 
Cabinet Shoppe. 
11. At trial, the parties agreed that no technical 
objection was made to the lien of the Cabinet Shoppe. The court 
having found in favor of the Cabinet Shoppe as to the debt in 
question, also finds the lien of the Cabinet Shoppe on the 
property in question duly enforceable according to law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That pursuant to the second contract between the 
parties (Trial Exhibit 3>, Pack owes to the Cabinet Shoppe the 
sum of $5,025.00, together with interest thereon from and after 
October 4, 1988 until paid at ten percent (10%) per annum prior 
to entry of decree and twelve percent (12%) per annum after entry 
of decree, and attorney's fees and costs of $2,947.00. Pursuant 
to Rule 4-505(3), Rules of Judicial Administration, this amount 
shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution 
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or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit. 
2. That the Cabinet Shoppe is entitled to a decree of 
foreclosure pursuant to its mechanic's lien duly recorded in the 
offices of the Summit County Recorder as Entry #301604 on 
December 16, 1988. That property is more particularly identified 
as 
Lot 41, Jeremy Ranch Plat #1, according to the 
official records in the Office of the County 
Recorder of Summit County, State of Utah. 
3. The foregoing premises are ordered sold at public 
auction in the manner prescribed by statute by the Sheriff of 
Summit County, State of Utah, pursuant to the order of this 
court. 
4. That the proceeds of the sale should be applied in 
accordance with the Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale to be 
entered herein; that in the event that the proceeds of the sale 
are insufficient to pay the sums owing to the Cabinet Shoppe, 
that the Cabinet Shoppe should be awarded a deficiency judgment 
against Pack for any sums remaining unpaid. 
5. That Pack and all persons claiming under them should be 
forever barred and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and 
estate in and to said premises, and, after the period of 
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redemption expires, should be barred and foreclosed of all right 
and equity of redemption therein and thereto• 
DATED this Hcf day of J/^^fCxC. 1992. 
BY THE >C0URT: 
Approved as to form: 
Stephen L. Henroid 
000080 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on the day of June, 1992, I 
served the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
upon the following by hand delivery of a true and correct copy to 
his offices at the following address: 
Stephen L. Henroid 
Henroid & Henroid 
Suite 700-38 Eagle Gate Tower- ^?&L~^ 
60 East South Main Cfcroot ipTS.rj^c /*t«r*£ <T*#7* So* ^ *^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant 
L. Edward Robbms 
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Agreement between E.L. Pack and The Cabinet Shoppe Inc., Urie, 
Wyoming; hereby referred to as contractor. Cabinets to include 
but not limited to the following. 
Contractor to make necessary arrangements with stain vendor so 
owner may purchase approximately ( 15 ) gallons of stain to 
finish doors, molding, trim, casing. Stain to be same blend and 
lot as stain used on all cabinets. Owner to purchase at 
contractors actual cost. Color and mfg to be Watco, light walnut. 
All drawers and cabinets in kitchen; bathrooms; drawers and lower 
cabinets of wet bar; and bedroom #2 to include "Melamine" 
finish. 
Kitchen island to be oM^V&iBed* panel construction on all sides. 
$East side of lower stage kitchen cabinets, that portion under bar 
overhang, to include same raised panel look. WXiWgS Sties* and^ends 
of supper 'affd lower ^stage cabinets in kitchen and entertainment 
center to include this * raised panel feature. Flat surfaces not 
acceptable. If questions arise consult owner. Va^i+^ Flat* Skfl-fcc* 
i H Contractor to provide entertainment center with oak counter top, 
O OAK IO? except wet bar area. Hold lamination joints to a minimum, take 
lSVc»utffrtextra care to eliminate conflicting grain flows and contrasting 
loo4-K p**-grays and reds. Add one extra coat of lacquer to his counter 
fOo€'J^ top. Wine rack to be of "criss cross" construction. Do not 
luill faiveinclude wine glass holders under upper stage cabinets. 
All shelves in all cabinets to be adjustable. All cabinet 
assemblies include drawer handles and cabinet handles and or 
knobs. 
Cabinets above wet bar to include two glass doors each. Upon 
request of owner, contractor to provide wet bar doors to owner so 
etched glass (owner furnished) may be installed. 
Vine rack to hold 10 bottles maximum with open shelf above rack. 
Wet bar finished height 35 1/2 inches tall. Remaining portion of 
entertainment center to be 33 1/2 inches finished 'height. Please 
manufacture accordingly. Wet bar sink area to cantilever out four 
inches as shown. 
Addendum C 
<^ 
Include custom oak hood over range* Raised panel construction. 
Owner to supply contractor with fan assembly. Vontractor to 
include mounting of fan and transition from fan outlet to exhaust 
flu. Owner to wire in. 
Use highest quality hinges available. European type hinges or 
equal. Consult Owner. 
Include oak valance over kitchen sink. Raised panel construction. 
Kitchen sink to cantilever out as shown on drawing. Valance to 
cantilever out to follow sink cantilever. 
Include light box over kitchen island. Raised panel construction. 
Include crown mold and dental mold. Approximately 54" X 62". Use 
gold para-cube light difuser. 
Include oak light frame and gold para-cube difuser in master bath 
and main bath. 
Laundry room cabinets to include crown mold and dental mold. 
Contractor to provide owner with cabinet feet dimensions and 
position so plumbing can be completed to kitchen sink and both 
toe kick heaters. 
Kitchen cabinet and master bathroom cabinet to have removable 
bottom to access toe kick heater and make final connections. 
Contractor to install grills for toe kick heaters. 
Include two tip outs in front of kitchen sink. 
Basement vanity to have off-set so east door will clear. 
Bedroom 02 to include student desk With two pencil drawers. 
Include cabinet above desk as shown on drawing. 'Allow space 
between top of cabinet and ceiling. 
All cabinets to include oak kick plates. ^ XX 
Hold distance between double cabinet doors to 4MM. 
ftAll drawer fronts to have rabbet Joints; dowelled, glued, and 
^-^^^ screwed. All drawers to have metal sides. Drawers supplied to be 
<L©wV *#* contractors top of the line style and construction. Discuss 
i v ^ s u c t x * ^ c o / 3 , s t r u c t - i o n o j f drawers with owner. 
lj) Overlay fillers to be double thick or same thickness as cabinet 
^ doors on all cabinets. 
1 3 / u * » i i doors and drawers to be a minimum of 13/16 inch thick. 
[7u. 
All drawer fronts to be one solid piece of oak. Carefully look 
over raised panel doors that are laminated. Doors with obvious 
grey streaks, red streaks, conflicting grain flows, etc.,will be 
changed out by contractor. 
Stain to be applied evenly. Over staining areas will not be 
accepted. Extra care to be taken where raised panel portion of 
cabinet doors meet frame portion. 
Beveled portion of cabinet doors to be milled as smooth as face 
of raised panel to eliminate over staining of beveled areas. 
Make maximum effort to match grain flows. Knots in any cabinets 
t will not be accepted. 
tfSft&'lOv-' + Two of the five upper stage cabinet assemblies in the 
p ~.£fj
 # entertainment center to have double doors. Upper stage cabinet 
r ™ lip next to wet bar and upper stage cabinet next to east wall to be 
tfi^'^J (\*? open with adjustable shelves. Stereo speakers (owner furnished) 
^ l ? 1 v\i^*"/ t o ^e Placec* in these areas. 
Those cabinets to the east of the kitchen island to have two roll 
out trays. 
Lazy susan's supplied by contractor shall be of the highest 
quality available. 
Contractor to remove all shipping cartons, paper, boxes, cans, 
bottles, lunch sacks, etc. brought on to job by him or his 
employees. Leave all installation areas clean and swept. 
Remaining sanding marks; gouges; holes; un-even application of 
stains, ^sealers, and lacquer; mis-Installed hardware, faulty 
hinges, faulty drawer rollers, any doors or drawers out of level 
or square; any cabinets out of level or square; not anchored to 
wall properly; any doors or drawers not operating smoothly and 
correctly; etc. ; will be considered a job un-completed. 
Contractor responsible for damage to paint, wall board, doors, 
linoleum, etc., as well as cabinets during installation. 
Contractor to provide and install crown molding and dental mold 
around all upper stage cabinets. 
All upper and lower stage cabinets to include raised panel type 
construction, with rounded corners. 
Contractor to provide owner with three complete sets of drawings 
on all cabinets and return with signed agreement. Drawings to 
include details of all features. Drawings to be approved by 
owner. 
Contractor to use the^ ^ljitest state of the art manufacturing 
techniques with a high^regard for quality control. Contractor t o 
use the highest quality materials available. 
W Contractor is a licensed contractor, and liable for any necessary 
permits and licenses required to work in Summit County. 
Contractor to be fully insured and carry Utahtystate Workman's 
Compensation Insurance. Owner not responsible for lost or stolen 
tools and or materials. Owner not responsible for death or injury 
incurred at job by contractor or his employees. 
Contractor to provide cabinets for entire^hou^^^^r^the above but 
qg£^limited^ to; for the 'amount of"* IPf-TOO. ° ° . Price 
includes drap&ge; installation, sales tax. Cabinets to be' 
guaranteed for'period of two'years. Cabinets td be of the highest 
standard of* quality, no seconds will'be accepted. Contractor to 
Entertain any reasonable requests by owner. 
BxL'fPack agrees to provide payment if full within thirty days 
after completion and final inspection by E.L* Pack 
Contractor tf
€
f****£j.iHU? ~~ &r/<Lr*- Date & ^^<P* 
E.L. Pack S*Cy A , rZr£$?) Date S ~/¥ P<P 
Qabinets to be delivered end installed on: , / 
STANDARD FORM OF A b K t t n c * . 
JetweenaT K^L - r^rJL Purchaser 
Hoie AadSress 1ST 
Delivery A d d r e s s ^ ^ ^ ^ h o 
And Seller: THE CABINET.SHOPPE Phon* (307)-782-6129 
Address: P.tL Bar 1379 Lvaan. «v. 82937 
o* I. The seller agrees to furnish the materials and services set forth in the drawings (I and dated ) and 
description annexed hereto. 
Contract price I XjgVO*6* 
Sales tax $ 
Total purchase price S f f ^ C T k ? , 0 ^ 
Schedule of payeent: ' 
Upon signing of this agreement..! 
II Upon pickup/delivery %<f ,<Tft>CQ~~ 
This contract includes the teres and provisions as set forth herein. 
Please read and sign where indicated. 
°* 2. The delivery date, when given, shall be deeaed approxiiate and performance is subject to delays caused by strikes, 
fires, natural disasters, availability of the product at the tiie of delivery. 
#K3. The risk of loss, as to daaage or destruction, shall be upon the delivery and receipt of the product. The purchaser 
agrees to accept delivery of the product when ready. II Cabinets not picked up after 5 days of coipletion are subject to storage 
charges. Cabinets not picked up after 30 days will be sold to recover the balance due. 
<?K4. The purzhiser understands that the products described m specially designed and custoe built and that the seller takes 
iaaediate steps upon execution of this agreeaent to design, order and construct those iteas set forth herein; therefore, this 
agreeaent is not subject to cancellation by the purchaser for any reason. 
5 ?<c*» 5. No installation, pluabing, electrical/ flooring, decorating or other construction work is to be provided unles; 
specifically set forth. 
ovt &. Cabinet area is to be heated; aust be cleared of all debris, painted and all electric and pluabing. ready before cabinet 
are installed. Seller is not responsible for daaaged products after delivery and,or installation. 
° * 7. Delays in payaent shall be subject to a late charge of 125.00 per aonth. If the seller is required to engage th 
services of a collection agency or an attorney, the purchaser agrees to reiaburse the seller for any reasonable aaounts expende 
in order to collect the unpaid balance. 
fH «*c«£ B. This agreeaent sets forth the entire transaction between the parties; any and ail prior agreeaents, aade by either pari 
are superseded by this agreeaent. All changes in this agreeaent shall be aade by a separate docuaent and executed with the sa/ 
foraalities. 
9. The seller retains the right upon breach of this agreeaent by the purchaser to sell those iteas m the seller 
possession, in effecting any resale on breach of this agreeaent by the purchaser, the purchaser shall be liable for any n 
deficiency on resale. 
10. The seller agrees that it will perfora this contract in ccnforaity with custoaary industry practices. The ourchas 
agrees that any claia for adjustaent shall not be reason or cause for failure to aake payaent arising froa or under i \ 
contract shall be* settled by arbitration and jurisd>c^on, the arbitration shall be held under the rules of the Aaer:: 
Arbitration Association. 
Accepted: Q^^T^S^HOL Accepted\^7.£. 7^£> 
Sexier . Purchaser 
Pate 6n?£jK Mtg-Zf-pp 
DESCRIPTION ATTACHED 
CABINET WARRANTY 
THE CABINET SHOPPE warrants their cabinets against defects in aatenal and workaanship for a period an one year froa the dat 
delivery to the original purchaser. 
THE CABINET SHOPPE warrants their drawer guides, hinges and adjustable shelf rails for a period of three years. 
Iapcrtant: This warranty does not cover daaage resulting froa aisuse, abuse, or lack of care to the cabinets. All wan 
defective parts aust be returned to THE CABINET SHOPPE prepaid. >*This warranty does not include labor, aileage or install. 
charges. This warranty is VOID if payaent is 30 days past due/ You aay obtain warranty service by calling THE CABINET S! 
A^Monrlum D 
